

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 ISO-00 SSO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
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O R 241305Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7363
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMCONSUL LAHORE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBJ SY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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AMEMBASSY ROME
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USINT BAGHDAD
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 ISLAMABAD 5166

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PEPR, CENTO, XD, IR, UR
SUBJECT: EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY

REF: (A) STATE 118510(NOTAL) (B) KABUL 4225 (NOTAL)
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1. I MET THIS MORNING WITH FONSEC SHAHNAWAZ--WHO IS
ACTING IN PLACE OF FOREIGN "MINISTER" AGHA SHAHI--FOR A
FULL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, NOTES, AND IMPRESSIONS ON THE
CURRENT SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. POLCOUNS AND MFA
DIRECTOR AMERICAS ALSO PRESENT.

2. I HAD NOT DISCUSSED MATTERS AFGHAN WITH FONSEC SINCE 12 MAY WHEN WE COMPARED INITIAL REACTIONS TO AFGHAN COUP AND I OUTLINED CONTENTS OF CENTO PAPER (REF A), AND A LOT HAS HAPPENED IN THE INTERVAL TO SHARPEN OUR IMPRESSIONS OF THE CURRENT OUTLOOK AND POLICIES OF THE KABUL REGIME. I HAD ALSO RECEIVED UNMISTAKABLE INDICATIONS THAT THE GOP WAS BEGINNING TO WONDER IF THIS EMBASSY IS SOMEHOW "SOFTER" ON AFGHAN MATTERS AND LESS WILLING TO FACE REALITIES THAN OUR COLLEAGUES IN KABUL (AS PURVEYED PRESUMABLY BY THE PAK AMB IN KABUL), SO I DECIDED NOW WAS THE TIME TO HAVE ANOTHER EXCHANGE.

3. SHAHNAWAZ WARMLY WELCOMED MY EFFORT, SAID "WE ARE HUNGRY FOR DETAILS," AND PROCEEDED NOT JUST TO GIVE ME HIS UNEYIDED ATTENTION FOR TWO HOURS BUT TO JOIN IN THE EXCHANGE WITH EXCERPTS FROM REPORTING TITLES FROM HIS AMBASSADORS IN KABUL AND MOSCOW. I SHOULD ADD THAT SHAHNAWAZ IS OF AFGHAN ANCESTRY, A MOHAMMADZAI HIMSELF, AND HAS BOTH SPECIAL INTEREST AND CLOSE KNOWLEDGE OF AFGHAN AFFAIRS.

4. BRIEFLY, I TOOK THE LINE THAT WHILE WE STILL BELIEVE A CAUTIOUS, NON-PRECIPITOUS POLICY SUITS OUR EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP WITH AFGHANISTAN'S NEW RULERS, WE FIND LITTLE REASSURANCE IN THE INFORMATION WE ARE RECEIVING ABOUT THEM. THE RHETORIC OF THE REGIME REMAINS 'SOCIALIST,
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NON-ALLIGNED,' BUT THE MAKEUP OF THE CABINET IS MARXIST/ LENINIST, ITS ORIENTATION APPEARS INCREASINGLY TOWARD MOSCOW, AND IN A GENERAL WAY, THE SOVIETS ARE RESPONDING BY MOVING IN WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF AGREEMENTS, A STEP-UP IN AIR DELIVERIES TO AFGHANISTAN, AND AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER AND DISPERSION OF SOVIET ADVISORS.

5. I NOTED THAT SOME GOOD THINGS ARE BEING PROPOSED, IN TERMS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN SUCH AREAS AS EDUCATION, HEALTH, LITERACY, AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS, ETC., BUT THERE IS DARKER SIDE ALSO, OF PROPERTY BEING CONFISCATED AND PEOPLE DISAPPEARING FROM THEIR HOMES AT NIGHT. SHAHNAWAZ SAID THIS SQUARES WITH HIS INFORMATION, NOTING ALSO THAT AFGHAN PM HAD TOLD PAK AMB THAT THE "PEOPLE WHO HAVE SUFFERED AT THE HANDS OF THE MOHAMMADZAI TYRANNY WOULD NEVER UNDERSTAND IF THE NEW GOVERNMENT WERE NOW TO SHOW COMPASSION"; THOSE MOHAMMADZAIS UNDER 14, HE SAID, CAN LEAVE THE COUNTRY AND DO WHAT THEY WILL, BUT THOSE 14 AND OLDER WILL HAVE TO STAY AND FACE POSSIBLE CHARGES.

6. I TOLD FONSEC WE AND OTHERS HAD EXPRESSED OUR CONCERNS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION AND FOUND THE AFGHAN LEADERSHIP

SENSITIVE IF NOT RESPONSIVE TO THE ISSUE. PAKISTAN,
FONSEC NOTED, MUST BE CAREFUL ON THIS SUBJECT BECAUSE
OF ITS "SPECIAL SITUATION."

7. WE HAD PARALLEL INFORMATION THAT THE REGIME HAD CUT
BACK ON PUSHTUNISTAN MENTIONS AND RHETORIC BUT THAT
MEETINGS WITH AND MESSAGES FROM PUSHTUN AND BALUCHI LEADERS
CONTPFUED TO BAUREPIDTED. FONSEC SAID THIS IS ESMajor
WORRY ON THE PART OF GOP. DRA OFFICIALS HAD TOLD PAK
EMBASSY THAT "AN INTENSIVE STUDY" OF THE WHOLE PUSHTUNISTAN
QUESTION IS UNDERWAY IN KABUL. ONE REPORT EVEN SUGGESTS
THAT A REASON WHY FORMER PM (AND AMB TO PAKISTAN) ETEMADI
IS BEING KEPT ALIVE IS SO HIS KNOWLEDGDFOF THE SUBJECT
IS NOT LOST TO THE REGIME. AFGHAN LEADERS, HE SAID, "ARE
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TALKING SWEETLY, BUT THEY ARE GOING BACKWARDS."

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8. IN SUPPORT OF THIS, HE NOTED THAT DAOUD HAD ASSURED THE GOP HE WOULD TALK ONLY OF PUSHTUNS, NOT BALUCHIS, HE WOULD NOT MENTION DURAND LINE, AND HE WOULD DROP MENTION ALSO OF PHRASE "SELF-DETERMINATION." NEW REGIME, ON THE OTHER HAND SUPPORTS "SELF-DETERMINATION" OF THE BALUCHI
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AND PUSHTUN PEOPLES, "BASED ON THEIR OWN FREE WILL AND UPON HISTORICAL BACKGROUND," WHICH CAN BE READ AS A CHALLENGE TO THE DURAND LINE. PRIMIN TARAKI ON 9 MAY AND FOREIGN MINISTER AMIN IN HAVANA 19 MAY HAVE BOTH USED ABOVE FORMULATION -- WHICH GROWS OUT OF THE 1977 KHALQ MANIFESTO.

9. ON THE INTERNAL SECURITY FRONT, I NOTED THAT REGIME APPEARS TO BE SETTLING IN WITH LITTLE TROUBLE, ALTHOUGH WE HAD HEARD THIS WEEK OF SOME DIFFICULTIES IN PAKTIA; FONSEC CONFIRMED PAKTIA UNREST, BUT TERMED IT "ISOLATED," WITH "NO MAJOR IMPACT." REGIME, HE SAID, FEARS MOHAMMEDZAI'S, HOWEVER.

10. HE AGREED THAT WHILE THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS AS YET, THERE IS PLENTY OF ROOM FOR TENSIONS TO GROWN UP BETWEEN PARTY PROFESSIONALS AND TECHNOCRATS, AS WELL AS TENSIONS BETWEEN THE DURRANIS AND THE GHULZAI'S AND OTHER TRIBALS. HE AGREED THAT THERE IS ALSO THE POTENTIAL FOR DISILLUSIONMENT WHEN THE REGIME'S PROMISES BEGIN FALL FLAT. BUT HE ASSUMES THE RUSSIANS WILL BAIL THE DRA OUT WITH MORE MONEY AND MORE TECHNICIANS AND THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL AVOID A CONSPICUOUS ROLE AND PLAY THEIR HANDS VERY CAREFULLY. IN THIS AREA, HE SUGGESTED WEST MIGHT LATER ON WANT TO EXAMINE ITS AID CAREFULLY SO IT DOES NOT MAKE THINGS EASY FOR SOVIETS OR CONTRIBUTE TO SOVIET AIMS IN AFGHANISTAN.

11. OF THE SPECIFIC AFGHAN LEADERS, GOP IS WATCHING BABRAK KARMAL (VICE PRIMIN) AND HAFIZULLAH AMIN (VICE PRIMIN AND FONMIN) MOST CLOSELY. PAK "IMPRESSION IS THAT BABRAK IS THE REAL POWER" AND THAT PRIMIN DEFERS TO HIM, FREQUENTLY BY NAME (E.G. "I MUST CONSULT WITH BABRAK KARMAL AND MY OTHER COLLEAGUES, ETC."). PAKISTAN KNOWS HIM WELL

BECAUSE HE HAS LONG BEEN CLOSE TO AJMAL KHATTAK, FAR-
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LEFTIST PUSHTUN LEADER LONG RESIDENT IN AFGHANISTAN, AND
NAZISH AMROHI, UNDERGROUND GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE
PAKISTAN COMMUNIST PARTY, WHO FLOATS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND
AFGHANISTAN.

12. IN DISCUSSION OF KHALQ AND PARCHAM PARTIES, FONSEC
AGREED SPLIT HAD BEEN MORE PERSONAL THAN IDEOLOGICAL BUT
NOTED THAT PARCHAM FACTION -- WHEN IT SPLIT AWAY -- WAS REGARDED BY
MOST OBSERVERS AS THE MORE RADICAL OF THE TWO.
HE SAID THAT REUNIFICATION OF THE TWO HAD BEEN GENUINE AND
WAS ACCOMPLISHED -- IN REACTION TO GROWING CONSERVATIVE
BENT OF DAOUD GOVERNMENT -- AS RESULT OF PRODDING AND HELP
FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND IRAQ;
HE CITED A 1976 EDITION OF IRAQI PAPER TARIQ AL-SHA'AB
ARTICLE DETAILING IRAQI CP ROLE IN KHALQ-PARCHAM DIALOGUE.

13. I NOTED OUR CONCERN THAT DRA HAS NOT REAFFIRMED ITS
COMMITMENT TO EXISTING TREATIES. SHAHNAWAZ SAID HE
BELIEVES DELAY HAS TO DO WITH REGIME'S STUDY OF PUSHTUN
PROBLEM AND EXACT RELATIONSHIP WITH DURAND LINE; NEW REGIME
MAY "NOT BE READY" TO CONFRONT DURAND LINE QUESTION BUT
COULD NOT AVOID IT IN SUCH A BROAD POLICY STATEMENT.

14. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS MADE BY SHAHNAWAZ OF
POSSIBLE INTEREST:

(A) HE EXPLAINS RISE IN KHALQ PARTY MEMBERSHIP NOW
BEING CLAIMED BY DRA AS MERELY WIDESPREAD USE OF EASILY
ACQUIRED MEMBERSHIP FORM AS DEVICE FOR GETTING ACTION IN
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS; IF YOU CAN SHOW SUCH A FORM,
THINGS HAPPEN, BUT IF YOU CANNOT, NOTHING HAPPENS.

(B) GOP FOUND AMIN RECEPTION IN MOSCOW MOST
INTERESTING BECAUSE OF 19 MAY TASS EMPHASIS ON PARTY-TO-
PARTY LINKAGE. AMIN WAS DESCRIBED AS MEMBER OF THE
POLITBUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE AFGHAN PARTY AND VICE
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PRIME MINISTER/FOREIGN MINISTER; GROMYKO'S PARTY POSITION WAS
MENTIONED FIRST AS WELL.

(C) GOP ALSO FINDS IT A STRANGE COINCIDENCE THAT
AMIN AND INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY JEGAT MEHTA WERE IN

MOSCOW AT THE SAME TIME; FONSEC ASSUMES THEY MET. MEHTA MET WITH PAK AMBASSADOR HAIDAR IKMOSCOW (THEY WERE ICS BATCH-MATES PRIOR TO PARTITION) WITH A WORD OF ADVICE TO THE EFFECT THAT GOP, IN ITS OWN BEST INTERESTS, MUST NOT ACT TOO EXCITEDLY OVER AFGHAN DEVELOPMENTS, LEST IT CREATE A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY; HE ALSO REPORTEDLY URGED (PRIVATELY) THAT THE GOP AVOID RUFFLING THE USSR ON AFGHANISTAN AND PARTICULARLY THAT "REACTIVATION OF CENTO WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE." SINCE FONSEC CANNOT IMAGINE HIS INDIAN COUNTERPART'S HAVING PAKISTAN'S BEST INTERESTS AT HEART, HE ASSUMES MEHTA WAS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF INDIAN-SOVIET-AFGHAN INTERESTS. THE RUSSIANS, HE NOTED, AS WELL AS BABRAK, HAVE ALSO RECENTLY ASKED WHY PAKISTAN IS A MEMBER OF CENTO, AND RUSSIANS SUGGESTED THAT CENTO MEMBERSHIP COULD "GET IN THE WAY OF RELATIONS." FONSEC, WHO HAS STRONG SUSPICIONS OF INDIAN MOTIVES IN EVERYTHING, SAYS HE EXPECTS A CONTINUATION OF "COORDINATED MOVES" ON THE REGIONAL "CHESSBOARD."

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AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMCONSUL LAHORE
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(D) WHILE GOP NOTES DROP IN PUSHTUN ANTHEM, ETC. ON RADIO KABUL, SUBSTITUTION OF AFGHAN NATIONAL ATHEM AND EMPHASIS ON BROADER QUESTION OF ETHNIC INTEGRATION AND IMPROVEMENT OFFERS NO BALM TO GOP ANXIETIES; RATHER GOP FEARS DRA MAY ARHZIQXO MELD PUSHTUN-BALUCH ISSUES INTO SECRET

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BROADER INTEGRATION QUESTION IN AFGHANISTAN. IN THIS CONTEXT, GOP FINDS OMINOUS SUCH DRA REFERENCES--IN PUSHTUN/BALUCHI CONTEXT--AS NEED TO SAMPLE "PEOPLES' OWN WILL" AND TO FIND SETTLEMENT ACCORDING TO "HISTORIC INTERPRETATION."

15. AS FOR PAK POLICY, HE SAID GOP IS DETERMINED TO KEEP OFFERING HAND OF COOPERATION TO DRA UNTIL AND UNLESS IT IS FIRMLY REBUFFED. HE SAID PAK AMB HAS DELIVERED LETTER FROM GENERAL ZIA TO AFGHAN PRIMIN SAYING THE GOP IS PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH AFGHNISTAN TO THE LIMIT OF ITS POWERS, THAT GOP IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS ALL COMMONN PROBLEMS WITH DRA, AND THAT IF IT IS WITHIN PAKISTAN'S ABILITY, PAKISTAN WILL PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN ANY AREA THE DRA SUGGESTS. AS FOLLOW-UP TO THIS, DRA ASKED GOP TO MORE THAN DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF BOXCARS ALLOCATED DAILY TO HAULING AFGHAN CARGO FROM KARACHI TO AFGHAN FRONTIER INTERCHANGE POINT. GOP ESTIMATES THAT IT WOULD TAKE 1600 BOXCARD LOADS TO CLEAR UP THE ESTIMATED 12,000 TONS OF GENERAL CARGO AND 14,000 TONS OF FOOD (INCLUDING MEAT) NOW IN KARACHI AND DESTINED FOR AFGHANISTAN; NONETHELESS, MFA HAS RECOMMENDED TO GEN ZIA THAT MAXIMUM EFFORT BE MADE TO INCREASE NUMBER OF BOXCARS PER DAY TO COOPERATE WITH AFGHANS. MFA HAS ALSO GIVEN SPECIAL PERMISSION FOR SHIPMENT OF PESTICIDES FROM INDIA TO TRANSIT WAGAH AND LAHORE BY RAIL TO PESHAWAN AT REQUEST OF DRA (ALTHOUGH GOP HAS NO INTENTION OF OPENING THE WAGAH BORDER TO GENERAL TRANSIT TRADE.)

16. BUT GOP IS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS; THE ASSESSMENT IN GENERAL ZIA'S RECENT LETTER TO PRESIDENT IS HOLD UP. FONSEC WOULD LIKE TO BE DISPROVED, HE SAID, BUT THE FUTURE DOES NOT LOOK BRIGHT. WORST OF SECRET

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ALL IS IMPRESSION, AT HOME AND ABROAD, THAT PAKISTAN IS FRIENDLESS AT THIS MOMENT IN ITS HISTORY; HE CITED DIFFICULTIES HE HAS HAD WITH IRANIANS ON ALLEGED THREAT TO CUT OFF AID AS ANOTHER EXAMPLE (SEPTTEL). "WE CAN KEEP CONVEYING TO YOU OUR CONCERNS," HE SAID, "BUT WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT YOU CAN OR WILL DO." AND, HE ADDED, "WE FEAR THAT OUR APPARENT OF FRIENDLESSNESS WILL ENCOURAGE THE DRA IN TIME TOR RASH ACTIONS."

17. FONSEC CONCLUDED BY THANKING ME FOR BRINGING THESE MATTERS TO HIS ATTENTION; HE APPRECIATED THS EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND HOPED IT WOULD CONTINUE. HE EXPRESSED SOME SENSE OF SATISFACTION--HOWEV' 974 5#3 09453,5 -- THAT OUR IMPRESSIONS OF THE EVOLVING SCENE IN KABUL ARE SO SIMILAR, THUS HELPING TO CORROBORATE AND CONFIRM CONCLUSIONS GOP IS NOW DRAWING.
HUMMEL

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